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ENERGY ON THE MOVE: TREATIES ON TRANSIT OF ENERGY VIA 
PIPELINES 
 
Danae Azaria 
 
The Panel Session ‘Energy on the Move: Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines’ 
was part of the 110th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 
on 31 May, at 1pm. Dr. Danae Azaria acted as speaking moderator and the speakers 
were Professor Gabrielle Marceau, Mr. Matthew Kronby, and Mr. Matthew Weiniger.  
Each speaker gave a seven-minute talk on a case study involving a dispute concerning 
a transit pipeline. The rest of the session took the form of a discussion based on 
questions by the moderator. The panel discussion was followed by fifteen minutes of 
questions from the audience.  
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy is an indispensable resource for the economic development of states 
and the survival of their populations. However, energy resources are located unevenly 
in the world, and their transportation may require the crossing of multiple borders. 
Transit is the passage through the territory (or areas where a state exercises sovereign 
rights) of one or multiple states.1 As such, transit is essential for exporters to reach 
energy markets (‘security of demand’) and importers to reach energy sources 
                                                        
1  DANAE AZARIA, TREATIES ON TRANSIT OF ENERGY VIA PIPELINES AND COUNTERMEASURES 26-30 
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(‘security of supply’). It is thus not surprising that in the twenty-first century states 
attach to pipelines the importance they attached to rivers in the nineteenth century and 
to international canals since the nineteenth century.2 The control of routes for energy 
transit is a valuable political and economic ‘asset’ for states through whose territory a 
pipeline crosses. At the same time, transit states themselves depend on energy exports 
and imports by user states of transit pipelines.  
In light of this interdependence, international law has, throughout the last 
century and in this century, witnessed a proliferation of treaties in this field: some 
treaties prescribe general obligations regarding exports, imports, and transit that apply 
to pipelines, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) and the 
Energy Charter Treaty (‘ECT’); others do not specifically define and regulate transit, 
but may include rules which apply to carriage of energy, including transit, such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’), or may include rules for the 
protection of investment, which apply to transit pipelines, such as the ECT and 
NAFTA; and others are tailor-made for a particular pipeline, such as the Nabucco 
Pipeline Agreement, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Treaty, the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi 
Pipeline Treaty, the West Africa Gas Pipeline Treaty, and the Sudan/South Sudan Oil 
Agreement.  
This treaty practice differs from transit rights of landlocked states. In relation 
to the latter, three multilateral treaties 3  have been concluded that establish rights 
intended to correct a geographical inequality with a view to ensuring freedom of the 
high seas for all states. In contrast, treaties on transit pipelines are concerned with 
securing uninterrupted energy flows through pipelines. Furthermore, those treaties 
                                                        
2 Id., at 1. 
3  Convention on the High Seas (29 April 1958) 450 UNTS 11; Convention on Transit Trade of 
Landlocked States (8 July 1965) 597 UNTS 42; Part X, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3. 
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that do not exclusively apply to transit via pipelines have, in the post World War I and 
II eras, represented the historical belief that transit, as part of trade, is a pillar of peace 
and can ensure stable international relations, while also addressing a need for transit 
brought about by changes to geographical borders.  
The contemporary importance of transit pipelines for international peace and 
security is illustrated by the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. In 2011, upon 
secession of South Sudan from Sudan, the previously domestic oil pipeline in Sudan, 
which connected oil deposits located in South Sudan to the sea, became a transit 
pipeline carrying oil from South Sudan through Sudan to the sea. The income from oil 
sales accounts for more than 90 per cent of South Sudan’s total annual revenues and, 
at the time of the 2011 secession referendum, the oil sales accounted for more than 70 
per cent of Sudan’s revenues, which it lost after the secession. In January 2012, South 
Sudan and Sudan failed to agree on transit fees, and Sudan unilaterally took oil in 
transit as compensation for transit services. In response, South Sudan stopped exports 
to Sudan and to third states through the transit pipeline (e.g. China, Malaysia, Japan, 
and Saudi Arabia). In April 2012, South Sudan’s military invaded Sudan and 
occupied part of Sudan’s territory, and the Sudanese forces gained control over an 
area in the territory of South Sudan. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter 
VII, required the two states to cease all hostilities and ‘unconditionally to resume 
negotiations concerning oil’.4 An Oil Agreement, alongside a Security Agreement, 
was included in the 2012 umbrella Cooperation Agreement between the two states, 
which was intended to finally resolve their wider bilateral dispute.5 The rationale 
                                                        
4 SC Res. 2046 (May 3, 2012). 
5  Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan (27 
September 2012); Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the 
Government of the Republic of the Sudan on Oil and Related Economic Matters, appendix to 
Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan (27 
September 2012). 
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underpinning the Cooperation Agreement was to put an end to the spiral of unilateral 
responses by each state against each other. However, the agreement’s formulation, 
which has also established a ‘Petroleum Monitoring Committee’ composed of the Oil 
Ministers of each to oversee the agreement’s implementation and serve as a forum for 
dispute resolution (without providing for compulsory judicial dispute settlement), 
does not necessarily achieve the exclusion of unilateral countermeasures under the 
law of international responsibility in response to breaches of any covered agreement 
under the umbrella Cooperation Agreement (including in the form of suspending 
compliance with obligations within the covered agreement breached, or by ‘cross-
suspension of obligations’). 6  It is thus questionable whether the Oil 
Agreement/Cooperation Agreement has (or could have) achieved its objectives.  
More generally, despite the conclusion of treaties on energy trade and transit, 
most of the international disputes involving oil or gas transit in the twenty-first 
century have involved the suspension of exports in response to interference with 
transit or the suspension of transit in response to interference with exports to the 
transit state.7 The paradigmatic example of such a dispute is that between Ukraine and 
Russia concerning gas transit and exports in the midst of a harsh winter in 2009, 
which left populations in seventeen states, some of them members of the European 
Union (‘EU’) and others situated in the Balkan region, without gas and heating for 
two weeks. This dispute and ensuing energy crisis has had an unprecedented influence 
on European energy policy and law.8 All states involved were bound by agreements 
establishing international obligations regarding transit, imports and exports of gas, for 
                                                        
6 For analysis of the dispute and the agreement, and its relationship to responses to breach under the law 
of treaties and state responsibility: AZARIA, supra note 1, at 148-151. 
7 Id., at 89-93, 224-227. 
8 Danae Azaria, State Responsibility and Community Interest Obligations in International Energy Law: A 
European Perspective, 5(2) CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L AND COMP L. (forthcoming)(2016). 
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example, the ECT and/or the WTO Agreement. 9  Notwithstanding the widespread 
effects of the interruption of transit of energy via pipelines, affected states and the EU 
did not formally invoke the responsibility of the transit state (or the exporting state) 
for a breach of obligations regarding transit (or exports respectively). However, as 
discussed below, this silence is not evidence that international law does not apply or 
that international responsibility was not engaged.  
 
II. THE WTO AGREEMENT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND 
BESPOKE PIPELINE AGREEMENTS 
 
For the WTO, transit of energy via pipelines is of increasing importance, as 
numerous oil and gas exporting and transit states have acceded to the WTO; Russia’s 
accession (2012) being the most recent. As at 30 April 2016, eight of the twelve 
members to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (‘OPEC’), and 
seven of the eleven state parties to the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (‘GECF’) are 
WTO members. While there is no framework agreement on trade in energy in the 
WTO, and under the 1947 GATT and in the first two decades of the life of the WTO 
Agreement disputes concerning energy trade were not prominent,10 pursuant to the 
customary rules on treaty interpretation set forth in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), the terms ‘goods’ or ‘products’ in 
GATT includes oil and gas. The subsequent practice of WTO members in the 
application of GATT establishes the agreement of WTO members to oil and gas 
                                                        
9 The EU and its Member States were WTO Members and ECT Contracting Parties at the time of the 
dispute. Ukraine was a WTO Member and ECT Contracting Party. Russia had not as yet acceded to the 
WTO, but was provisionally bound by the ECT pursuant to the latter’s Article 45: Yukos Universal Ltd. 
(UK—Isle of Man) v. Russia, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, para. 394. 
On 20 August 2009, Russia expressed its intention not to become party to the ECT and since 19 October 
2009 is not provisionally bound by the treaty (ECT Article 45(3)(a)). 
10 The only 1947 GATT case dealing with energy activities: Panel Report, US—Taxes on Petroleum and 
Certain Imported Substances, BISD 34S/136 (17 June 1987). 
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falling within the scope of GATT (VCLT Article 31(3)(b)), and in any event, 
supplementary means of interpretation confirm this interpretation (VCLT Article 32).  
Moreover, GATT Article V on freedom of transit applies to transit via 
pipelines and if a WTO Member interrupts energy transit via a pipeline within its 
territory this act may constitute a breach of GATT Article V,11 albeit disputes may be 
expected to arise in the future as to whether the scope of GATT Article V covers 
transit via pipelines. On the other hand, there is no evidence that this provision 
requires WTO Members to construct or to permit the construction of transit pipelines 
within their territory. Thus, in the context of the Keystone XL transit pipeline dispute 
between Canada and the US,12 Canada would not have been successful in bringing a 
complaint under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘DSU’) against the US 
concerning the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline on the basis of GATT 
Article V. 
As a separate matter, the DSU is an exclusive and mandatory mechanism for 
settling disputes concerning violations (and non-violations) of WTO obligations, and 
standing under the DSU is generous allowing any WTO Member to invoke 
responsibility for breaches of WTO obligations, including those under GATT Article 
V. It thus accommodates the particular realities of the oil and gas markets: there is 
one world oil market and gas market prices depend on oil prices.  
However, other aspects of the DSU are not appropriate for dealing with energy 
trade and transit in situations where energy crises may occur. First, under the DSU, in 
cases of urgency, it may take more than to 5 months before the Dispute Settlement 
Body adopts an Appellate Body (‘AB’) Report. Second, good offices, conciliation, 
and mediation can be initiated at any time, but they depend on the consent of the 
                                                        
11 AZARIA, supra note 1, at 36-38. 
12 Report Opens Way to Approval for Keystone Pipeline, New York Times, 31 January 2014. 
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parties to the dispute (DSU Article 5), and recourse to arbitration by establishing 
tighter time frames than those under the general DSU proceedings (DSU Article 25) is 
possible, but this option also depends on the consent of the parties to the dispute. 
Third, the DSU lacks (institutional) interim measures.13 A restriction of oil or gas 
transit may persist during consultations and the process before a Panel and the AB, 
and may have catastrophic consequences on energy markets, domestic economies and 
the populations in states of destination and origin, such as occurred in Europe owing 
to the 2009 energy crisis. While it is not realistic to expect that the DSU may be 
amended to address these issues, its current structure begs the question whether WTO 
Members will bring disputes similar to the 2009 Ukraine/Russia dispute to the DSU, 
as their significant and immediate security of supply and security of demand interests 
would not be accommodated by the current legal architecture of the DSU. 
On the other hand, the Energy Charter Treaty – the first sector-specific treaty 
open to universal accession – specifically addresses transit of energy via pipelines. 
ECT Article 7 requires Contracting Parties to take the necessary measures to facilitate 
transit (paragraph 1), and (in contrast to GATT Article V) to permit the construction 
of transit pipelines through their territory, unless they can demonstrate to the other 
ECT Contracting Parties concerned that such construction would endanger the 
security of its energy systems (paragraph 5). It requires ECT Contracting Parties not 
to interrupt or permit any entity subject to their control to interrupt or require any 
entity under their jurisdiction to interrupt existing transit flows in the event of a 
dispute over any matter arising from transit.  
The ECT provides for a conciliation procedure for settling transit disputes, 
which can lead to binding interim measures (paragraph 7), and transit disputes also 
                                                        
13 For analysis of DSU in this respect: AZARIA, supra note 1, at 168-172. 
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fall within the jurisdiction of the inter-ECT Contracting Party arbitral tribunal (ECT 
Article 27).14 None of these provisions have been resorted to despite the number of 
transit disputes between ECT Contracting Parties. However, beyond the political 
reasons that may surround the choice not to resort to them, the legal architecture of 
the dispute settlement provisions may contribute to the inaction of affected ECT 
Contracting Parties in this respect. The conciliation procedure (ECT Article 7(7)) is 
not compulsory and is subject to the exhaustion of previously agreed remedies 
between Contracting Parties or between entities of Contracting Parties (which may 
include inter-state arbitration or commercial arbitration respectively thus making 
recourse to the conciliation procedure unlikely). Additionally, the conciliator only has 
‘jurisdiction’ to deal exclusively with the transit dispute under Article 7, and cannot 
adopt binding measures vis-à-vis terms and conditions or prices for exports or 
imports, which may be (an often is) an important aspect of the overall dispute 
surrounding transit.15 Furthermore, the ad hoc arbitration under Article 27 is available 
only after exhausting diplomatic means (paragraph 1), and it may take up to 180 days 
for such a tribunal to be established, and thus to be capable to issue provisional 
measures (paragraph 2).16 Since ECT provisions have been transposed verbatim into 
treaties between states that are not ECT Contracting Parties, such as the Energy 
Protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty,17 similar questions about the scope and content of 
obligations set forth in the ECT and the dispute settlement provisions may arise in 
other regions of the world in the future. 
Moreover, transit pipelines are mega-projects; they require intensive long-term 
investment and are constructed and operated on the basis of a network of agreements 
                                                        
14 Id., at 177-178.  
15 Id., at 178-184. 
16 Id., at 177-178. 
17 ECOWAS Energy Protocol (A/P4/1/03) (31 January 2003) 42 ECOWAS OJ 71. 
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between states and enterprises (state-owned, state-controlled or private enterprises). 
They are often governed by (a) a treaty tailor-made for the project (‘bespoke pipeline 
treaty’); (b) an agreement between the state and the project investor, the entity which 
will construct, own and operate the pipeline (often called ‘host-governmental 
agreement’); and (c) agreements between the entity operating the transit pipeline and 
an entity which makes use of the infrastructure for transportation purposes. Examples 
of such frameworks are those for the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the Baku-Ceyhan-
Tbilisi Pipeline and the West Africa Gas Pipeline. Additionally, international 
financial institutions (e.g. World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) are 
often involved in such projects and establish standards (including environmental and 
social standards) by which the borrower entities (private entities or states) have to 
comply as part of the loan agreement with the financial institution. 
A particular development in the field of bespoke pipeline treaties pertains to 
their institutional equipment. They often establish Pipeline Committees or 
Implementation Commissions, which are composed of representatives of each treaty 
party and serve as a forum for the long-term cooperation between treaty parties. They 
also enjoy competences in relation to facilitating the implementation of and 
overseeing compliance with the treaty, and at times (but not always) are involved in 
dispute settlement. The competences of each pipeline committee vary, and are broad. 
The architecture for implementing the mandate of each pipeline committee could 
emerge differently. However, currently the practice of the committees is minimal (and 
in relation to some committees altogether absent). Hence, although it cannot be 
doubted that their practice may have some effect on the interpretation of each treaty 
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over time, 18  it is difficult to give a definitive answer as to the full scope of 
competences of the committees, and their relationship with the implementation of 
international responsibility for breaches of obligations therein (for instance, in the 
form of interrupting transportation) by recourse to countermeasures under customary 
international law.  
 
III. EFFECTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
REGULATORY MEASURES AND THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
Transit pipeline projects can have significant consequences for local 
populations and the environment. The conduct of states that permit (or undertake 
obligations for) the construction and operation of such pipelines in their territory may 
be incompatible with their international obligations under human rights treaties, and it 
is thus possible that a complaint by an individual may find its way before a human 
rights court or tribunal (or quasi-judicial body), where available. As a separate matter, 
where an international financial institution is involved in the project, in case of non-
compliance by the financial institution with its own operational (environmental, 
human rights and social) standards, affected individuals may bring complaints under 
the accountability mechanisms of these financial institutions. 
Moreover, transit pipeline projects may raise questions about the compatibility 
of the transit state’s conduct, which may be taken in order to comply with human 
rights obligations or environmental obligations, vis-à-vis the project investor with its 
obligations under the host-governmental agreement and investment treaties. The 
                                                        
18 Vis-à-vis the impact on treaty interpretation of the practice of Conferences of Parties: Draft Conclusion 
10, Text of the draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties, as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its sixty-sixth session, Report of 
the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session (with commentary), A/69/10, pp. 168-217. 
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investor may under these arrangements have standing to resort to arbitration against 
the state, for a breach of the host-governmental agreement or of the investment treaty 
respectively (where applicable). Disputes of this kind will revolve around the transit 
state’s right to regulate. This type of regulatory measure and the ensuing dispute 
involve the conflict between (or need to balance) the ‘regulatory space’ of the transit 
state, with the need of other states to construct and to operate the pipeline in the long 
run for their economic development, and importantly with the regard to the investors’ 
economic interests. A recent example of a claim by an investor against a state for 
breaches of investment protection obligations is that between TransCanada 
Corporation & TransCanada Pipelines Limited against the US under Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA, on the ground that the US denied the permit to construct the pipeline within 
its territory, although the US had concluded that the pipeline would not have a 
significant impact on climate change.19 This dispute also illustrates the potential inter-
section of inter-state and investor-state proceedings: should there have been an 
obligation on the US under WTO/GATT and/or NAFTA to permit the construction of 
transit pipelines within its territory, there could have been inter-state proceedings 
under NAFTA and/or WTO, and investor-state proceedings under NAFTA.  
Furthermore, the engagement of civil society concerning the effect of such 
projects on human rights and the environment may influence the interpretation and 
implementation of the applicable legal framework. For instance, in 2003, in response 
to civil society action, the BTC Pipeline Implementation Committee and the BTC 
Investor made a Joint Declaration affirming the compatibility of the BTC Pipeline 
                                                        
19 TransCanada is suing the U.S. over Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline, The Washington Post, 
8 January 2016.  
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Treaty and the relevant Host-Governmental Agreement with human rights obligations 
of the three pipeline states and with environmental and labour standards.20 
More generally, because transit rights are exercised in the territory of another 
state, they face the risk of being subject to the transit state’s regulatory measures 
(environmental or social). Disputes surrounding such measures may involve the 
conflict of, and need to strike a balance between, community interest obligations (e.g. 
human rights obligations and some environmental protection obligations) with 
bilateral obligations such as those in bilateral or multilateral treaties, or other 
collectively owed obligations (erga omnes partes or interdependent) under bespoke 
pipeline treaties. 21  Importantly, owing to the involvement of and effects on 
individuals, transit pipelines and disputes surrounding them contextualise the place of 
the individual in the development and enforcement of international law. 
 
IV. INTERRUPTING TRANSIT AS A MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
In the UN era, where forcible responses to wrongfulness are prohibited, 
countermeasures under the law of state responsibility in the form of suspending 
compliance with obligations in the energy sector rank high—if not first—among the 
available responses with significant effects and corresponding persuasiveness. Transit 
pipelines may be seen as a tool for the enforcement of international law. The 
Sudan/South Sudan dispute and the potential responses that Ukraine could take 
against Russia’s unlawful use of force in Crimea by suspending compliance with its 
obligations concerning transit of gas and oil brilliantly illustrate the contemporary 
                                                        
20 Catherine Redgwell, Contractual and Treaty Arrangements Supporting Large European Transboundary 
Pipeline Projects: Can Adequate Human Rights and Environmental Protection be Secured?, in M.M. 
ROGGENKAMP et al (eds.), ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW (2012) at 102-117. 
21 AZARIA, supra note 1, at 110-124. 
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importance of this issue, which pertains to the relationship between countermeasures 
as circumstances precluding wrongfulness under customary international law on state 
responsibility, and treaty language which may overlap and displace this function of 
countermeasures.  
Some treaties concerning energy trade and investment contain security 
exceptions: for instance, GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 24 (‘nothing shall 
prevent the parties from’). A number of arbitral tribunals, in a series of investor-state 
arbitrations against Argentina under bilateral investment treaties to which Argentina 
is party, have dealt with the relationship between security exceptions and 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility 
differently.22 However, the more persuasive position is that, when the language used 
in the security exception is (or resembles substantially) the language in GATT Article 
XXI and ECT Article 24, the exception delineates the scope of primary treaty 
obligations. In contrast, circumstances precluding wrongfulness are part of secondary 
rules and preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise be wrongful: 
conduct that would not fall within the scope of security exceptions. 23  The WTO 
Panels and AB have not dealt with this particular question substantively, although one 
may presume that they would be inclined to prioritize the ‘closure’ of WTO law, and 
                                                        
22 Treaty exceptions are lex specialis and supersede the customary circumstances precluding wrongfulness: 
LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras. 245-261. 
Interpreting treaty exceptions through VCLT Article 31(3)(c) to incorporate conditions from 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness under custom: CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of the Tribunal, 12 May 2005, paras. 315-382. 
23 Text of the draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts with commentaries 
thereto, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, ILCYB 
2001, Vol. II, pp. 31–143 (‘ILC Commentary to the ASR’), p. 71, para. 1; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment, 25 September 2007, paras. 129-135; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Ad hoc Committee, Decision on the Request for Annulment, 29 June 2010, paras. 200-204. 
  14 
thus the displacement of countermeasures taken in the form of suspending compliance 
with WTO obligations in response to breaches of obligations outside WTO law.24 
On the other hand, most bespoke pipeline treaties do not contain security 
exception provisions, but contain other language that may displace countermeasures 
in the form of interrupting transportation in response to breaches outside these 
treaties. For instance, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Treaty permits non-performance of 
treaty obligations only by prior consent of all parties (Article 12). This treaty 
provision may be interpreted as displacing countermeasures in this particular form – 
albeit such interpretation would entail the displacement of any other unilaterally 
operational circumstance precluding wrongfulness under customary international law. 
Avoiding energy flows via pipelines becoming a means of enforcing international 
obligations is a crucial interest of states dependent on the established energy flows via 
a particular pipeline. But, by excluding countermeasures in the form of suspending 
compliance with obligations concerning uninterrupted energy flows, pipeline states 
forego an important tool for their protection against breaches of international 
obligations by states dependent on the pipeline. In light of the opposing interests 
between treaty parties and the opposing interests that each treaty party may have 
(some may be importers at the same time as being transit states), the relationship 
between these treaties and circumstances precluding wrongfulness under custom is a 
matter of interpretation, and will likely be the subject of a dispute as to the correct 
interpretation. The ambiguity of the language in bespoke pipeline treaties allows 
                                                        
24  Implied inclination (yet misplaced reasoning): Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft 
Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 24 March 2006, paras. 69-76, 79. For further analysis and 
criticism of the lex specialis argument here: AZARIA, supra note 1, at 83-88. 
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parties to make arguments in the future to the effect that countermeasures are or are 
not excluded permitting them to better pursue their interests in different situations.25 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued that disputes regarding transit of energy are ‘commercial’, 
technical, or political. This proposition intends to cast doubt over the application of 
international law in this context. Such doubt is unfounded. The fact that disputes have 
political, economic, scientific, and technical aspects does not mean they are not 
disputes ‘capable of being settled by the application of […] international law’.26 A 
dispute may involve a disagreement about facts, as was partly the case in the 2009 
Russia/Ukraine dispute, but a dispute about facts does not exclude a dispute about 
law.27 Settling a dispute by non-judicial means does not mean that international law 
does not apply. The decision to invoke the international responsibility of a state may 
be political, but the fact that responsibility has not been invoked does not mean that 
responsibility has not been engaged.28 
Placing treaties on transit of energy via pipelines alongside each other and in 
the wider context of public international law, provides an opportunity to reflect on the 
infinite variety of treaty obligations concerning transit of energy via pipelines, but 
also the infinite variety of the interests that states wish to protect and pursue by such 
obligations over time. The trend of ‘treatification’ in this area may be due to a number 
                                                        
25 As to the lawfulness of such countermeasures under custom (to the extent that they are not displaced by 
treaty lex specialis), e.g. on the basis of their effect on fundamental human rights obligations, and on the 
basis of proportionality: AZARIA, supra note 1, at 232-247. 
26 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion 2004 ICJ REP. 136  (July 9), para. 41.  
27 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (UK v. Greece), 1924 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30).  
28 When a state invokes the responsibility of another it has implicitly made its own determination that 
responsibility has ensued from an internationally wrongful act. Non-invocation of responsibility may mean 
that the invoking state has made the determination that there is no breach, but it may be due to numerous 
other (e.g. political and/or economic) reasons. ILC Commentary to the ASR, pp. 116-117, para. 2. 
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of different factors. First, it is inconclusive whether general customary international 
law exists concerning transit over territory.29 Even assuming arguendo that it does, it 
is inconclusive whether such customary rules apply to transit via pipelines. Second, 
the rules in treaties of general scope (e.g. GATT), may not be perceived as 
sufficiently detailed or appropriate for transit via pipeline generally or even for 
particular pipeline projects (owing to the particular geopolitical context), and thus 
even parties to such treaties of general scope may prefer to conclude bespoke pipeline 
agreements. Third, numerous treaties provide for dispute resolution or create 
institutions often endowing them with dispute settlement or compliance supervision 
competences, which would otherwise be unavailable. Fourth, bespoke pipeline 
treaties and the overall legal framework for such projects provide for the protection of 
corporations involved in the construction and operation of transit pipelines allowing 
them to protect and pursue their financial interests by recourse to arbitration against 
pipeline states, which may otherwise be unavailable. Fifth, geopolitics in particular 
regions may be better accommodated by bespoke pipeline treaties, and energy 
security interests of states may change over time making treaty interpretation an 
important method for accommodating the long-term and short-term interests of states 
in relation to transit pipelines. 
                                                        
29  The customary freedom to lay pipelines on the high seas applies in the continental shelf and the 
exclusive economic zone, while the delineation of the pipeline’s route on the continental shelf is subject to 
the coastal state’s consent. 
